

18 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NIO

SUBJECT: Comments on the Recommendations
of the "Rockefeller Commission"

1. The recommendations of the Commission fall into two rough categories. The first includes the calls for change in organization, directives, statutes and procedures; most of the recommendations dealing with "The CIA's Role and Authority" and with "Supervision and Control of the CIA" fall into this category. A second category comprises admonitions that the Agency cease doing specific things that it has done in the past. A good many of the recommendations in the section on "Significant Areas of Investigation" fall into this category; these, in addition, are, or ought to be, covered by the recommended changes in organization, statutes, etc. Their very appearance, however, serves to make a most important point: as the report puts it, "The Agency must rely on the discipline and integrity of the men and women it employs" and "the best assurance against misuse of the Agency lies in the appointment to that position /DCI/ of persons with the judgment, courage, and intelligence to resist improper pressure and importuning, whether from the White House, within the Agency, or elsewhere." In other words, there must be civility in our relationships with superiors and customers, and a sense of high purpose in our view of ourselves, if the Agency is to function both effectively and properly. I wish that the report had made both these points explicitly and not just the first, for the current investigations -- justified though they are by certain past actions of the Agency -- place at risk some important intangibles.

2. As to specific recommendations made by the Commission, I have the following comments:

a. Recommendation 1b: It is not the CIA which now has responsibility for protecting intelligence sources and methods, but the DCI. In my view, that



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responsibility should continue to reside with the DCI, not merely for the Agency, but for all elements of the Intelligence Community. The job has to be done across-the-board and it is best done by an individual whose responsibility is to the President and whose mandate covers the entirety of intelligence activities.

b. Recommendation 3: Presumably this recommendation for a joint committee on intelligence applies to the Agency, although the term CIA does not appear in it, and it could be taken to apply to oversight of the entire Community. That should be clarified. In any event, the time is long since past when it made sense for the Agency to resist such a proposal. For one thing, opposition to it would have a much more self-serving cast than before the current spate of attacks on the Agency. For another, developments within the Congress itself rule out a continuation of the old system. That is to say, there has been a real and apparently permanent change in the way the Congress does its business; the rank-and-file no longer seem prepared to accept the undocumented assurances of its more senior members that all is well with CIA, anymore than they are willing to follow the lead of committee chairmen on other matters. Finally, a properly constituted joint committee on intelligence could become a distinct asset to the Agency in carrying out its business; it could also help prevent possible further misuse of the Agency by the Executive Branch.

c. Recommendation 4: This is a carefully conceived and apparently limited recommendation for publicizing the Agency's budget, but I do not see how proper limits would be maintained once that kind of thing is started.


d. Recommendation 5a: I have some doubts, which I am frankly not able to articulate very well, about using the PFIAB to provide oversight of the CIA. It is not the kind of job that can be done by a panel of distinguished citizens with only the chairman in a full-time role. The functions assigned to it are those which should be performed by the chain of command of the Executive Branch and by the Director of Central Intelligence himself. Just how the PFIAB in

its enlarged role would fit in remains unclear to me.

e. Recommendation 5c: This recommendation, authorizing the Inspector General to report directly to the PFIAB, places the Inspector General in an impossible position and has the potential for creating mischief.

f. Recommendation 8a: This recommendation for two DDCIs is not entirely clear. Presumably the first deputy would be in the chain of command and run the Agency on a day-to-day basis. The other deputy presumably would not be in the chain of command and would serve in effect as a liaison officer with the military and with the military intelligence agencies. The latter functions are important, but they scarcely require the creation of a deputy director with no other duties than to carry them out. If there is any logic to this proposition at all (and I doubt it), then why not a deputy who should be a foreign service officer serving the function of fostering relations with the State Department and providing the Agency with technical expertise on State Department intelligence requirements? And one for the Treasury? The problem of the relationship between the DCI and the Deputy Director should be resolved administratively and not in the fashion proposed. To a very considerable degree the Director must administer the Agency if he is to be an effective DCI. And that is one important reason why proposals to move the DCI downtown make no sense.

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